There is a lot of talk around town (Tokyo) to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are planning to go all out in a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course I informed our government,” wrote U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in his diary on January 27, 1941, 10 months before the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Yet that blow against the U.S. Pacific Fleet turned out to be a huge surprise—especially to the two American commanders of record in Hawaii: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter Short.
The two men had taken their assignments in Hawaii in February 1941, just a few weeks after Grew had conveyed his warning to officials in Washington.
Did government officials fail to notify the new Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii? Were Kimmel and Short too busy getting established to think about it? Or did they dismiss the very idea as emanating from the pipe dream of some cheeky Japanese admiral? In any event, Grew’s warning about Pearl Harbor was ignored.
So it came to pass on December 7, 1941, that the Pacific Fleet, the pride of the American navy, was decimated by the Japanese attack.
Questions Surround the Pearl Harbor Attack
Kimmel and Short appear together here because they are inextricably linked. Together they share some responsibility for the single most devastating military disaster in American history. During World War II, their leadership, or lack of it, allowed the Japanese free rein in the Western Pacific. In a matter of months, the Japanese had taken the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore. There was no American fleet to oppose them. In effect, Pearl Harbor was the first domino to fall.
Were Kimmel and Short guilty of dereliction of duty? Were they scapegoats? Or was there another possible explanation somewhere in between?
There have been many reports about Pearl Harbor by both official and private agencies. Many books have been written about the disaster, and occasionally, a motion picture or television documentary tries to “shed new light” on the subject.
However, many decades after the event, the basic questions about Pearl Harbor still persist:
•What did government officials know about the Japanese intentions?
•What was learned from decoded Japanese secret military messages and when was that information obtained?
•What warnings were given to Kimmel and Short, and when were they given?
•How did the Hawaiian commanders prepare for what was coming?
Whatever data exist can be used by both supporters and detractors of the two commanders to make their cases.
A Rivalry between Two Commanders
Husband E. Kimmel was born in 1882 in Henderson, Kentucky. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1904. His most auspicious assignment was budget officer for the navy, from 1937 through 1940, operating in Washington, D.C.
Walter Short was born in 1880 in Fillmore, Illinois. He never went to any of the military academies, but was commissioned an officer following his graduation from the University of Illinois. During World War I, he served in France. After the war, he was one of the top officers at Fort Benning, Georgia.
What happened after Kimmel and Short took their new, divided commands in Hawaii? The word divided is used deliberately, because in those days, there was great rivalry between the army and the navy, and not just in Hawaii. It was traditional, but it worked ultimately to the detriment of both services. Was there a communications gap between Kimmel and Short? Did one know what the other was doing?
Whatever the answers to those questions, it is clear that Japanese intelligence officers were keeping track of exactly where in Pearl Harbor every single U.S. Navy vessel was located. This was learned by American code-breakers, who decoded secret Japanese mes-sages to and from Japanese consular officials in Honolulu shortly before Pearl Harbor.
The problem is that other intercepted Japanese messages during the same time also indicated an interest in the Philippines and the Canal Zone. As a matter of fact, fewer messages dealt with Hawaii than either of the other two American bases.
A Warning Is Ignored
There is no doubt, however, about the official war warning of November 27, 1941, 10 days before Pearl Harbor. It was transmitted from Washington to all the top army and navy commanders in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Canal Zone, and the Presidio: Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated.... Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
The meaning of this unambiguous message sent by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (Number 21) was clear: Take the first hit, but be prepared for what is coming and take defensive measures.
Pearl Harbor was asleep, literally as well as figuratively, that December Sunday morning. In the early months of 1942, there were cries for the court-martial of both Kimmel and Short; they were later allowed to retire. To the end, both Kimmel and Short argued that if they had had access to the decoded Japanese messages, that they would have been prepared. They blamed their ignominy on Washington officials seeking scapegoats for Pearl Harbor.
Questions Linger
Political enemies of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Number 2) hinted, or have said out-right, that he knew an attack on Pearl Harbor was coming and had failed to notify the Hawaii command. This is hard to believe when considering several facts about Roosevelt and the U.S. Navy. Roosevelt’s first government role was assistant secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration. More importantly, as president, he was commander in chief of both the army and navy. Any damage to the armed forces would be a personal affront. Additionally, with war approaching, it is inconceivable that Roosevelt would put the Pacific Fleet in peril.
Several months after the Pearl Harbor attack, Kimmel and Short stood accused of dereliction of duty. The two officers, ready to face a court-martial, were prepared to say that they simply had not had access to the decoded messages that had been intercepted. Clearly any formal proceedings would have resulted in the Japanese learning that their code had been compromised. The officers were allowed to retire, and later investigations would conclude that the pair simply had used poor judgment. Short died in 1949 and Kimmel in 1968.
In the case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, one winds up with more questions than one began with. Perhaps there will never be a final resolution.
0 comments:
Post a Comment